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For more than three decades, scholars have examined thegrossly unequal state-
levelper capita distribution ofNew Deal spending. Why did small population
rural states such as Nevada, Montana, and Wyoming receive up to six times as
many federal dollars per capita as densely populated states such as
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York? Empirical studies employing
economic and political variables have had mixed results in explaining this
distribution. Whatpast studies neglect is that a large proportion ofNew Deal
dollars went towards the creation ofpublic goods, which had spillover effects
particularly upon those who lived in close proximity to these projects. This
paper suggests that the state-level distribution of per capita expenditures
during the 1930s is consistent with what would be expected to followfrom an
economically efficient allocation ofpublic goods.
The past few years have seen a crescendo of interest in reexamining the economics and
politics of the New Deal.’ Recent literature regarding the New Deal political economy
highlights the strong inverse correlation between per capita spending and state population
size and density. States with small populations, and particularly those that are sparsely
populated, such as those in the Mountain West (e.g. Montana, Wyoming, and Nevada)
received up to six times as many federal dollars per capita as New England states with large
and/or dense populations such as New York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
Public choice interpretations, starting with Gavin Wright, have examined potential
. political causes for this regional distribution. 2 For example, the aforementioned
Bateman and TaylorMountain West states tended to be “swing states” whose electoral votes were generally
among those most “in play” for presidential elections. Additionally, small population
states have, by construction, the most electoral votes per capita since they have more
senators per capita, an important measure in public choice studies of congressional
influence. 3 While such political factors may account for some of the unequal distribution
of federal expenditures per capita, it does not seem plausible that such behavior alone, or
even in conjunction with economic need-based factors such as unemployment rates,
could cause a state such as Nevada to receive around $1,500 per person while Connecticut
received only $237 per person. This paper offers a “spillover” explanation for the small
population state bias—an expenditure bias that has been identified in studies of the post
New Deal time period as well—but not, hitherto, in literature on the New Deal. 4 Per
capita spending involving the construction of spilover-creating public capital will
necessarily be larger in small population states than in large population ones for any fixed
level of per capita economic benefit. In fact, an efficient allocation of public goods
generally requires higher per capita spending in small population states than in large
population ones, as is consistent with 1930s expenditure patterns.
A Brief Overview of the Literature on the Distribution of New Deal Spending
A number of authors have examined the state-level dispersion of government
expenditures between 1933 and 1939 to investigate whether politicians attempted to use
the substantial increase in federal spending to “buy” votes in addition to, or instead of,
relieving economic distress. 5 For example, vote-buying could have been attempted by
Congressmen working to direct federal projects to their home districts in order to please
constituents. If this activity was common, one would expect to see states with more
powerful Congressmen, as determined by factors such as tenure and appointments to key
committees, to have enjoyed more success in securing such projects than those with less
powerful representatives. 6 Additionally, President Roosevelt could have used his influence
to direct important projects to “swing-states:’ i.e. those in which the winner of the state’s
electoral votes was largely uncertain, in an attempt to increase his chances of reelection or
to keep the Democratic Party’s coalition in place for his potential successor. The premise
of this literature is that politicians try to bring their constituents projects that will enrich
their lives so that constituents will, in turn, reward them with votes.
To test for the presence of vote-buying agendas during the New Deal, scholars have
regressed federal spending per capita against political variables that represent factors cited
above as well as economic variables such as the drop in per capita income and measures
of unemployment. 7 Given that much of this spending went toward the creation of
spillover-creating public capital, however, per capita spending fails to provide full
information on the benefits that spending provided (since per capita benefits are generally
derived from total spending on public goods). This raises an important question:
Assuming that the goal of any politician is to please his constituents, will he either try to
bring home as many dollars as possible regardless oftheir impactor try to initiate federally
funded projects that will have the most positive socioeconomic impact on constituents,
regardless of how much or little such projects cost? The quid pro quo nature of the political
1 60 economy literature clearly suggests that an assessment of the qualitative impact should be
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buying hypothesis using per capita spending can only assess the quantity of expenditures.
Public Capital and the New Deal
If New Deal expenditures consisted simply of transfer payments, an analysis of per
capita spending to test for potential economic and political determinants of its statewide
variation would be straightforward. Since a significant portion of this spending went
toward spillover-creating public capital, however, the analysis becomes more complex.
While New Deal expenditures have primarily been viewed in the context of a largely
unsuccessful attempt to bring full employment via a Keynesian-style demand stimulus,
economists have by and large ignored the potential supply-side effects of the New Deal in
providing public capital. 8 While clearly not all New Deal spending went to such projects
during the 1930s, the expansion in economically beneficial public capital such as, roads,
bridges, water and sewage systems, schools, hospitals, power plants, and airports is
indisputable. The installed capacity of publicly-owned electricity-generating plants rose
55 percent between 1932 and 1939, while capacity of hydroelectric power rose 35 percent
across the decade. 9 Miles of surfaced roads on state highway systems increased 34 percent
from 1930 to 1940.’° The number of municipal airports rose 42 percent between 1932
and 1938.11 The construction of new schools enabled a 50 percent boost in enrollment in
public high schools from 1930 to 1940.12 Hospital capacity rose 35 percent between 1933
and 1942.’ Although the economy languished well below full employment throughout
the 1930s—and there can be no doubt that a great deal of New Deal spending went to
“leaf-raking” projects that brought no spillover benefits—the stock of public capital
boomed due to a series of government re-employment projects entailing the construction
of such investments.
Evaluation of the relative welfare gains brought about by New Deal expenditures using
per capita spending is problematic.’ 4 Public capital projects are generally, at least to some
extent, non-rival and/or non-excludable. Multiple people, and in some cases, the entire
population, may benefit from the production of projects. Furthermore, Aschauer, Deno,
Munnell, Barro, and Easterly and Rebelo, among others, showed that public capital
investments significantly increase the rate of return to private capital investments. 15 To
the extent that private productivity is increased, income and welfare in the vicinity of the
public capital will rise. This implies that public capital projects could have helped speed
up recovery from the Great Depression in the areas that benefited from such projects
beyond any Keynesian-style demand stimulus that those dollars could theoretically have
provided. Similarly, public capital can favorably influence the location of future economic
activity and provides various non-pecuniary household benefits.’ 6
Such spillover effects mean that measures of per capita expenditures on public capital
yield biased welfare implications since the measured expenditures are divided equally
among the state’s population but multiple members of that population may
simultaneously realize the benefits ofthose expenditures. This may help shed light on why
rural, small population states—where dollars were likely to have experienced relatively
fewer spillover effects—received more federal expenditures per capita during the 1930s
and have continued to receive more since.
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Past literature has focused primarily on divining the intent behind the distribution of
federal expenditures while efficacy has been largely implicit in the background. Shifting
the focus, what if New Dealers, intentionally or not, spent economically efficient amounts
on public goods—that is the marginal benefits of spending were equal across all states and
shifting any appropriation from one state to another would cause a net loss in aggregate
welfare?’ 7 What attributes would such an allocation amongst the states have? The law of
diminishing marginal returns suggests that the benefits of each additional dollar spent
would fall. Clearly, then, the marginal benefits of the first dollars spent creating public
capital will be highest in highly populated areas, ceteris paribus, since this is where a
spillover-producing project would generally provide the most “bang per buck:’ Of course,
highly populated states like New York received the most total New Deal spending, likely
reflecting such efficiencies.
Now consider the marginal returns ofper capita spending. Because of spillover effects,
the marginal return on an additional dollar of total spending and an additional dollar of
per capita spending are predictably incongruent. In particular, the marginal return on per
capita spending on public capital is falls faster in highly populated areas than in lowly
populated ones. This follows because, for any given amount ofper capita spending, a high
population state, by definition, has more total spending than a low population one. With
respect to the production of perfectly non-rival public goods, it is the total quantity of
spillover-creating goods, not the per capita quantity, that most correlates to benefits.
The end result is that, ceteris paribus, a high population state will generally reach its
efficiency condition with fewer per capita dollars spent on spifiover-creating public capital
than a low population one. The per capita distribution ofNew Deal spending—with rural,
small population states getting the most per capita—is perfectly consistent with economic
efficiency given that much of this spending went to public goods.’ 8
A Simple Two-State Example
Suppose, for the purpose of exposition, a state, “Small:’ has a population of 100 and
the federal government spends $1,000, or $10 per capita, on a perfectly non-rival public
good that creates an average of $20 of benefit to each citizen of Small (assume benefits do
not spillover to other states). Suppose that another state, “Large:’ with a population of 500
also receives $1,000, in this case only $2 per capita, for the creation ofthe very same public
good, which also generates an average of $20 ofbenefit to each ofits citizens. Both ofthese
states receive the same per capita economic benefit from the public good, an average of $20,
even though federal per capita spending is five times higher in Small than in Large.’ 9 From
a political economy perspective, the constituents of Small and Large should be equally
pleased with the project secured for them, despite the large difference—a factor of five in
this case—in per capita expenditures.
From here, consider the effect of an additional dollar spent creating non-rival public
capital in the two states. The one-thousand and first dollar would clearly have more positive
impact in Large, since five times as many people could generally benefit from the public
capital’s creation. Clearly then, other factors constant, an efficient provision ofpublic goods
1 62 would have more total spending in Large than in Small. Following through on this logic,
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was reached at, say, $4,000 of total spending in Large, and $2,000 in Small. In per capita
terms, Large receives $8, while Small receives $20. With respect to per capita benefits,
however, citizens of Large are better off than those of the Small even though they received
far fewer per capita expenditures. See the Appendixfor a graphical analysis ofthis particular
case and for more general support for the supposition that an efficient level of per capita
spending on pure public goods will normally be higher in small population states.
Impure Public Goods and Population Density
Of course, the analysis carried out above is a simplification, as perfectly non-rival
public goods, which have a similar impact upon everyone in a state—or average impact—
are the exception rather than rule. Most public capital projects must be classified as
impure, rather than pure public goods. In particular, spillovers from public capital such as
roads, bridges, schools, libraries, and streetlights will generally create significant benefits
only to those who live or work in the areas near them rather than equally to all citizens of
the state. To the extent that depression-era public capital projects were associated with
geographically limited spillovers, a state’s population density would also have played a
role—perhaps an even larger one than population size—in determining the potential
economic benefits accrued from the creation of public capital.
Specifically, ceterispan bus, citizens in a densely populated state, such as Rhode Island,
would have received more per capita economic benefit from a dollar spent on the creation
of public capital than those living in a sparsely populated, rural state such as Wyoming or
Montana. This is because it was likely that a greater number of Rhode Islanders lived in
the vicinity of the capital. Following the logic above, per capita spending involving the
creation of public capital is, then, is a downward biased measure of the additional
economic welfare generated in densely populated states. Hence, one would generally
expect to see densely populated states receiving fewer per capita expenditures on public
capital than their rural counterparts, other factors held constant, if the aforementioned
economic efficiency condition was even remotely approached.
A Spifiover Effect Interpretation of Population and Land Variables Introduced in
Recent New Deal Spending Literature
John Wallis introduced each state’s inverse population—hereafter 1/POP—as a
potential explanatory variable for per capita New Deal spending. 2 ° His reasoning was that
“the federal govemment had to give some money to every state and that some programs,
such as highway grants, were allocated on the basis of population.” 2 ’ Wallis finds that
1/POP is not only statistically significant at the one percent confidence interval, but that
the variable alone accounts for over half the variation in per capita New Deal spending
between 1933 and 1939. The smaller a state’s population, the more per capita dollars it
received. “Since small states have more electoral votes per capita and electoral votes per
capita is an important component of several of the political variables, the statistical
relationship between spending and political variables may be the result of arithmetic
rather than behaviorY 22 In brief, if 1/POP is included, an important omitted variables
problem suffered by the previous literature appears to diminish. 1 63
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interpreted as apolitical because it is econometrically equivalent to that of senators per
capita (2/POP)—a variable used in the public choice literature to test for congressional
influence. 23 A reply to Fleck notes that, “The variable 1/POP represents lots of things.
Some, like state flags per capita, have no meaning at all. You, the reader, may interpret
1/POP however you like.” 24
Fleck also introduces land per capita (LAND/POP), which is the inverse of the
population density, as an explanatory variable because some New Deal spending formulas
allocated funds, at least in part, on the basis of land. He finds that states with more land
per capita received more per capita federal dollars and that the inclusion of LAND/POP
(even when included in a regression with 1/POP) further diminishes the omitted variables
problem. By including land per capita, Fleck claims his regressions, which have high r
squares and coefficients on the political and economic variables that are consistent with
their predicted signs reveal “an empirical relationship that has eluded economists for over
twenty-five years:’ 25
Ifthe land and population variables introduced byWallis and Fleck are the panacea for
the longstanding puzzle of what drove New Deal spending, the question of what effects
the population and land variables are picking up becomes key. Some of the effects picked
up by 1/POP and LAND/POP can surely be attributed to spending formulas as noted by
Wallis. However, because a substantial proportion of New Deal spending went toward
spillover-creating public capital, another reasonable interpretation of the coefficients on
these variables exists. When either run on their own or, particularly when included in a
regression together, 1/POP and LAND/POP are an excellent proxy for spillover effects (or
lack thereof) provided by public capital. Small population states, particularly those with
large amounts of land relative to their population, would have generally received the
fewest spillover benefits per capita from public capital-creating projects, because fewer
people likely lived in the spillover vicinity of the project. As established in the previous
section, an efficient allocation of expenditures on spillover-creating public capital would
generally entail states with high 1/POP and LAND/POP receiving the most per capita
spending, other factors constant.
Table 1 lists the forty-eight states in order of their per capita allotment of New Deal
spending between 1933 and 1939 and reports their inverse population (1/POP) rank. 26
Clearly, small population states such as those in the Mountain West stand out as the
biggest winners in terms of per capita New Deal expenditures. Indeed, Wright notes that,
“spending levels are so concentrated in the West that any variable which distinguishes the
West is bound to be correlated with spending’ 27 However, because these states are also
the ones where the spillover effects of public capital were generally the smallest, an
efficient provision of spending is likely to have been larger, independent of whether
politicians attempted to funnel these dollars to such states for political gain, to combat the
economic effects of the Great Depression, or, most likely, both.
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Per Capita Invetce Least Dense State Per Capita Inverse Least Dense
Allocation Pop Rank Pop Rank Allocation Pop Rank Pop Rank
Nevada 1499.39 1 9 Illinois 364.88 46 40
Montana 986.30 10 2 Texas 361.70 43 14
Wyoming 896.91 2 1 Mississippi 358.18 26 24
Arizona 791.46 6 4 Maryland 344.82 21 42
Idaho 744.15 7 5 Tennessee 344.48 34 33
North Dakota 707.84 11 8 Oklahoma 342.66 27 17
South Dakota 701.61 12 7 Missouri 340.07 39 28
New Mexico 689.76 8 3 Maine 336.07 14 16
Utah 569.49 9 6 New York 334.81 48 44
California 538.10 44 22 Indiana 333.22 37 38
Nebraska 536.87 17 12 New Jersey 330.47 40 47
Oregon 535.66 15 11 Delaware 310.13 3 39
Washington 527.77 19 15 Alabama 309.78 32 29
Colorado 506.30 16 10 South Carolina 306.43 22 31
Iowa 466.70 29 23 Massachusetts 286.26 41 46
Kansas 434.30 20 13 Georgia 272.69 35 26
Minnesota 425.50 31 18 West Virginia 265.11 24 36
Arkansas 396.12 25 20 Pennsylvania 260.88 47 43
Vermont 390.49 4 21 Virginia 254.91 30 32
Wisconsin 390.26 36 30 Kentucky 251.04 33 34
Michigan 388.99 42 37 New Hampshire247.76 5 27
Ohio 383.24 45 41 Rhode Island 246.56 13 48
Florida 377.21 23 19 Connecticut 236.92 18 45
Louisiana 369.88 28 25 North Carolina 227.55 38 35
Source: New Deal expenditures are from Reading. Population density was computed by dividing
population by acres of land—both variables are from the 1940 Census.
In addition to reporting per capita New Deal spending and population rank, Table 1
reports the population density rank of each state with 1 being the least densely populated
and 48 being the most. The correlation is striking. The nine least densely populated states
are also the nine states that received the most per capita New Deal expenditures. Such a
relationship would, in fact, be predicted when taking factors such as spillovers and impact
into account—viewing federal expenditures in this context can seemingly add to our
understanding of their distribution, both during the New Deal time period and after.
Regression specifications in Wallis, reprinted here in Table 2, which include as
independent variables both Wallis’s inverse population measure and Fleck’s population
density measure, confirm what is obvious from Table 1. While small population states
received significantly more per capita New Deal expenditures, densely populated states,
particularly those with more nonfederal land per capita (federal land per capita is
insignificant), received significantly fewer New Deal dollars per capita. The r-squares
indicate that, in fact, around 70 percent of the state-level variation in New Deal per capita
expenditures can be attributed to these factors alone.
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(t—statistics)
Wallis no. 3 Wallis no. 5
(1) (2)
INTERCEPT 223.28 236.26
(10.94) (10.78)
1/POP 78770100 77670907
(9.47) (9.42)
POP/LAND -0.24
(-2.35)
POP/LANDfederal 0.00
(1.52)
POP/LANDnonfederal -0.59
(-2.33)
N 48 48
R2 0.704 0.718
R2ADJ 0.691 0.699
Source: Table is recreated from John J. Wallis, “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending, Yet
Again: A Reply to Fleck.” Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001): 305-3 14.
A Brief Case Study: NewYork
New Deal spending in New York illustrates how the use of per capita spending on
spillover-creating public capital greatly understates the economic impact of such
expenditures in high population areas. With 10 percent of the nation’s population, New
York was far and away the most populous state and ranked fifth in population density
(forty-fourth on the least densely populated scale). Although New York ranked first in
total spending with close to $4.5 billion, it ranked only thirty-third with respect to per
capita New Deal spending with just under $335. A sizeable portion of these expenditures
went toward major public capital projects in the New York City metropolitan area such as
the construction of La Guardia airport and the Triborough Bridge complex. Several
million people in the nation’s largest urban area were likely to have benefited, directly or
indirectly (in the form oflower traffic congestion, increased rates of return to investment,
and increased leisure time, for example) from the creation of public capital projects such
as these.
Clearly the impact of public capital projects is understated by the use of per capita
spending measures and this understatement is exacerbated in densely populated areas
such as New York City, since the spillover effects associated with such projects were clearly
larger there than in, say, New Mexico. This can help explain, alongside political and
economic factors, why New Yorkers received relatively few per capita expenditures—less
than half as many as citizens of New Mexico and the Dakotas and almost five times fewer
than citizens of Nevada.
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Deal—the first major peacetime expansion of federal spending in United States history—
and, as such, has attracted a great deal of attention from economists and political
scientists. Wallis colorfully noted that literature on New Deal expenditures, now well into
its fourth decade, “depicts an econometric horserace” between political and economic
variables. 28 This paper does not join that horserace, but instead offers a new explanation
for past results. Far from being unseemly, the distribution, with small population states
receiving more per capita spending than high and densely populated ones, is entirely
consistent with an efficient allocation of expenditures on spillover-creating public goods.
This follows from the fact that the marginaL return on per capita spending, other factors
constant, falls faster in high population states than low population ones.
A public goods perspective casts a very different light upon the fact that rural states
such as those in the Mountain West typically received three to six times more New Deal
expenditures per capita than densely populated states such as New York, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts—an expenditure pattern that has continued to hold up
in more recent political economy studies showing that small population states generally
receive larger per capita allotments. To the extent that public capital projects provide
economically beneficial spillovers to those living near them, and to the extent that
politicians attempt to secure future votes by maximizing the impact projects have on their
constituents, such a state-level distribution of funds appears to be both economically and
politically sensible. Further empirical work should examine the composition of state-level
New Deal projects to determine more precisely the extent that expenditures in various
states went to spillover-creating public capital rather than simply transfer payments such
as agricultural subsidies or “leaf-raking” type projects.
Appendix
Figure A-I shows the corresponding marginal benefits of pure public goods in the case of
two states described in the text, “Small” with population of 100 and “Large” with
population of 500. Two properties of note are:
(1) The marginal benefit equals zero (intercept ofthe X-axis) at the same quantity ofpure
public goods in both states. This follows by construction since we assume that the citizens
of Large and Small have identical preferences such that the same Qt1 unit of the pure
public good provides no additional utility.
(2) The marginal benefit curve of Large (MBL) is always five times higher than the
marginal benefit curve for Small (MB 5 ), for all positive marginal benefits. This follows
because each unit of the pure public good provides the same average benefit to each
citizen, and there are five times as many citizens in Large as in Small. Note that for this to
be true, MBL is sloped five times as steeply as MB 5 , so that the marginal benefits of
additional projects are falling five times faster in Large as in Small.
Given the properties described by (1) and (2), at any quantity of pure public goods, such
asQ 5 , the marginal benefit for Large (Sc) is five times that for Small (c). Furthermore, for 1 67
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any constant marginal cost of providing a unit of the pure public good, such as c, “Large”
will always (assuming the equal-marginal definition of efficiency) receive a greater
provision than “Small” so that QL> Qs. However, since Large’s population exceeds Small’s
by a factor of five, Small will have more per capita spending so long as QL is less than five
times as large as Qs (QL < 5Qs)• This will be true for all c below In summary, for any
marginal cost below c—, an efficient level of per capita spending on public goods will
necessarily be higher in Small than in Large.
$
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